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Abstract 
In the so-called Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 'Health Check' the European 
Commission has recently proposed gradual transitional measures to allow a 'soft landing' of 
the milk sector to quota expiry. The aim of this paper is to support policy makers to get better 
insights in the implications of some of the most important economic assumptions and 
empirical choices made in partial equilibrium models focusing on dairy. Three partial 
equilibrium models are considered: the Agricultural Member states MODeling (AGMEMOD) 
model, the Common Agricultural Policy SIMulation (CAPSIM) model, and the European 
Dairy Industry Model (EDIM). The paper analyzes how the most important economic supply 
components, as they are part of the three key dairy models, affect milk production projections. 
A main conclusion is that the evaluation of the contribution of a study should not be based on 
one single characteristic (such as quota rents, supply responses). One isolated characteristic is 
not able to explain finally obtained model outcomes. Quota rents, supply responses, shifters 
and the demand side have to be integrated with each other.  
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Introduction 
Milk quotas were introduced in the European Union (EU) on April 1st 19841. Despite 
several critiques on the consequences of milk quotas2, the Council decided under the 
Luxembourg agreement to extend the milk levy until March 31, 2015. In the so-called 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 'Health Check' (HC) the European Commission has 
recently proposed gradual transitional measures to allow a 'soft landing' of the milk sector to 
quota expiry (Commission of the European Community, 2008). It is likely that the milk 
quotas’ abolition will be accompanied, ceteris paribus, by lower domestic prices. However, 
this will also depend on the development of further cuts on trade instruments and 
consumption subsidies.  
When modelling dairy policies, several important sources of information are required. 
First is the marginal cost of milk production (or shadow price of milk)3. Low marginal costs 
(or alternatively high quota rents) signal competitiveness and increase the probability of a 
positive output response. Second are the milk supply elasticities, which determine the slope of 
the supply function and therewith the change in output due to a change in the price. Third are 
the supply shifters which are affecting the position of the supply curve and its movement over 
time. The final supply response will most likely consist of a combined change along the 
supply curve and shift of the supply curve. Lastly, the final quantity will also be codetermined 
by the interaction with the demand for dairy products. 
The aim of this paper is to support policy makers to get better insights in the 
implications of some of the most important economic assumptions and empirical choices 
made in partial equilibrium models focusing on dairy. Three partial equilibrium models are 
considered: the Agricultural Member states MODeling (AGMEMOD) model (see for further 
details Chantreuil, et al., 2008), the Common Agricultural Policy SIMulation (CAPSIM) 
model (see for further details Witzke and Tonini, 2008), and the European Dairy Industry 
Model (EDIM) (see for further details Bouamra-Mechemache et al., 2008). All three models 
are focusing on the upcoming evaluation of the dairy CAP evaluation as considered by the 
ongoing HC. AGMEMOD and CAPSIM are agricultural multi-product partial equilibrium 
model whereas EDIM is a dairy partial equilibrium model. 
The paper analyzes how the most important economic supply components, as they are 
part of the three key dairy models, affect milk production projections. We have a threefold 
objective. First objective is to examine the economic significance of milk quotas from a 
(micro) economic perspective. Second, milk quota rents used in the three models are reviewed 
along with several considerations for equilibrium models. Third, it is analyzed how milk 
                                                 
1
 The objectives of milk quotas were to curb production, limit budget pressure, maintain market price support 
and ensure revenue stability for dairy farmers. For an historical overview on milk quotas, see Bianchi, (2004). 
2
 Notably: protections of inefficient dairy farms, capitalisation of milk quotas into land and support in the farm 
assets. 
3
 Note that when we assume the system to be ‘in equilibrium’ marginal cost is likely to coincide with the 
minimum locus of the average cost curve (no profits). 
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quota rents and supply elasticities are likely to affect the final outcomes. For this a 
comparative static framework is developed, including a stylized raw milk partial equilibrium 
framework. Two main assumptions are taken with respect the expected price decline 
consequent to quota expiry such as: an exogenous price decline or an endogenous price 
decline. This analysis is expected to provide more insights into the expected supply response 
in case of quota enlargement and/or quota abolition and be relevant for HC purposes. 
Moreover, it indicates what the relative importance of various factors is (magnitude of quota 
rents, responsiveness to price). Finally, it helps to disentangle and understand the contribution 
of the different economic drivers on the relative position of member states.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses on the 
economic significance of milk quota rents. Section 3 presents milk quota rent estimates 
highlighting some of the most relevant issues in translating this information into equilibrium 
models. Supply responses, shifters and raw milk demand are also discussed. Section 4 builds 
on a simple case study partial equilibrium model where the previously discussed quota rents 
and supply elasticities are used. Section 5 closes the paper with a number of remarks 
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Economic significance of milk quota rents 
In this section the economic significance of milk quota rents is discussed. When 
(binding) quotas are imposed on a market, this creates a difference between the price of the 
product received by farmers ( 0P ) and the marginal cost evaluated at the quota level ( 0MC ). 
This difference represents the ‘value’ of the quota, known as the quota rent shadowPPR −= 0 . 
(see Figure 1, left panel). The price equivalent to the marginal cost evaluated at quota level is 
also known as the shadow price of milk ( shadowP ). It is the minimum market price farmers 
need to get in order to supply the milk output corresponding with the quota. If the market 
price for raw milk is lower than shadowP  then the production will be lower than Q and the 
quota is not binding. In case the market price is higher than shadowP  production will be equal 
to the quota Q  with the quota constraint being binding.  
When removing the quota constraint a new equilibrium will establish where demand 
equals supply (see the allocation denoted by 11,QP ). As Figure 1 shows in this case this will 
lead to an increase in milk production. The main reason is that although the milk price goes 
down the effective price for farmers (i.e. the shadow price, which now equals the market 
price) still shown an increase from shadowP0  to 1P which induces output to increase from Q  to 
1Q . Note that the quota rent has now vanished. As regards the supply side, further note that 
the magnitude of the farm milk price decrease depends on the one hand on the magnitude of 
the quota rent and on the other hand on the slope of the supply curve (related to price 
elasticity of supply). With respect to the demand side, its slope is an additional important 
factor explaining the new equilibrium. Summarizing, the increase in production due to 
abolition of the quota is larger because of: i) the higher the quota rent, ii) the more elastic the 
supply curve, and iii) the more elastic the demand curve. 
The quota redistribution mechanism among member states is also likely to play a role. 
The effects of quota and its tradability on asset value has been analysed in Burrell, (1989), 
Dawson, (1991), Boots, (1999) and Colman, (2000), among others. Reallocation mechanism 
might enhance competitive milk production (i.e. freely tradable quota), or freeze milk 
production in non-competitive areas (i.e. regional restrictions on quota trade). As far as milk 
quotas artificially keep production in non-competitive regions or member states, changes in 
their administration might lead to significant shifts in production. Therefore it is not only the 
total amount of quota and the associated rent that are relevant, but also the way they are 
administered. For example when removing milk quota another effect might be that the supply 
curve will shift in downward direction (see Figure 1, right panel).  
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Figure 1 - Impact of quotas on market equilibrium  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adjusted from Réquillart et al., (2008). 
 
The reason for this is that potential inefficiencies generated by the quota system (such 
as milk not produced by the most efficient farms but rather by a mixture of efficient and 
inefficient farms) now vanish (see also Section 1). The magnitude of this efficiency-effect 
will depend on the way in which quota are tradable, the kind of restrictions imposed on quota 
exchange (regional trade restrictions, siphon, etc.), or, if not tradable, the nature of the 
administrative redistribution system. Quota trade might be restricted in order to maintain 
producers in less competitive areas in activity, with the quota instrument thus used as ‘rural 
development’ policy tool. This may even lead to a situation where within one country you 
have regions where farmers face binding quotas and other regions where quotas are non-
binding. In case quotas are tradable, efficient farms can already buy out inefficient ones, and 
there will be no efficiency impacts. In case other (e.g. administrative) quota distribution and 
reallocation rules are followed, inefficiencies are expected to play a role. Thus, when 
removing a quota system, the proper supply curve for determining the new market 
equilibrium is not the original one but rather the one taking into account the increased 
efficiency impact. 
In terms of implementation, milk production quotas are imposed through the payment 
of a fine (the so-called super-levy) as soon as a farmer’s production exceeds the quota 
(Council Regulation, 2003). If this rule is applied at the farm level, it means that the producer 
gets the market price in the limit of his quota and for the excess production he will not receive 
the market price, but the market price less the fine. Usually the fine is that large that the net 
return for a kilogram of surplus milk will by far not cover costs. However, as can be recalled 
from Figure 1, (left panel) if the farmer would have a quota rent R  that is larger than the super-
levy it would be rational to produce in excess of his quota. If he overproduces, then the total 
quantity he will produce is such that the marginal cost of production (evaluated at this level of 
production) is equal to the market price minus the fine. In order to well-understand why 
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systematic excess production is observed in some EU countries it is important to also exactly 
know how this system is applied. For example it needs to be known whether producers really 
pay the fine or only a part of the fine because this will determine at the farm level the 
incentive to produce over the quota or not. If he overproduces, then the total quantity he will 
produce is such that the marginal cost of production (evaluated at this level of production) is 
equal to the market price minus the fine.  
 
Quota rent estimates and related issues  
In this section the main available options to compute milk quota rents are discussed. 
This is followed by a review of the estimates used in the three partial equilibrium models 
considered. In addition a set of estimates used by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
model (Lips and Rieder, 2005) is also included.  
First, 'micro-econometric approaches' mostly estimate marginal cost functions by 
relying on market prices from the farm accountancy data network (FADN). Milk quota rent 
estimates are then derived by subtracting marginal cost from market milk prices. Some of the 
most recent studies following this approach can be found in Bouamra-Mechemache et al., 
(2002), INRA-Wageningen Consortium, (2002), Colman, (2002), Moro et al., (2005), 
Cathagne et al., (2006), Wieck and Heckelei (2007a,b). Micro-econometric approaches may 
suffer from aggregation issues. Two main types of aggregation can be followed during the 
estimation. The first estimates one equation for each country under analysis capturing farm 
heterogeneity ( see Cathagne et al., 2006). The second estimates one equation for each sub-
sample of farms classified according to size, location, etc. (see Moro et al., 2005 among 
others). The former takes the estimated total cost curve and then derives marginal cost curves 
by plugging in sample mean for each variable (i.e. outputs, milk quotas, fixed inputs, prices). 
This may cause problems for interpretation because it would not consider the position of 
farms on their marginal cost curve. The latter requires estimating marginal cost curves for 
each representative farm plugging in the observed value for the variable of that farm (i.e. 
outputs, milk quotas, fixed inputs, and prices) and then averaging among all specific values to 
each farm4. This method allows understanding how marginal costs vary in the sample due to 
different farm characteristics. Both approaches are likely to produce different results. 
Another important aspect is the relationship between marginal cost and average cost. 
Farms are conventionally assumed to be on the rising part of their shadow supply function 
above and to the right of the minimum of the average cost curve. Under this assumption 
expansion along this supply curve provides an answer when simulating milk production 
developments when quotas are phased out. However in several cases dairy farms may be on 
the left of the minimum of the average cost curve and in the downward sloping part of their 
                                                 
4
 This approach consists in estimating a set of cost curves characterized by similar shape but different positions. 
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shadow marginal costs function5 (see for further details Guyomard et al., 2004). One possible 
explanation for farms with decreasing marginal costs is that milk quotas freeze the possibility 
to exploit scale economies. Empirical findings suggest that marginal costs are almost constant 
and farms display elastic supply responses (Moro et al., 2005). One of the main issues is 
whether to include or to not to include during estimation those farms that do not behave 
according to standard microeconomic theory. One way could be to at least identify the extent 
to which farms deviate from this assumption. For example what would happen in case quotas 
are phased out for farms on the downward sloping part of their marginal cost curve? Those 
farms may still be viable after quota abolition if they are able to expand to the minimum of 
their average cost curve. However this may not be always a feasible option because of the 
investment required in terms of land. Direct payments become relevant in this context given 
that they can act as a 'safety net' while having a loss making farm. This may also allow 
farmers to adjust to the most profitable regions where scale economies allow reducing 
average production costs through scale expansion. 
Micro-econometric approaches, although grasped on micro data, are frequently based 
on sample data that do not reflect the most recent market developments. Therefore those 
estimates need in several cases adjustments. In addition micro-econometric approaches 
require defining the length of run or the degree to which dynamic adjustments in quasi-fixed 
factors are accounted for. This latter issue also brings in the time lag in the supply response 
whenever it is specified. In the short-run the quasi-fixed production factors are unlikely to 
adjust, but in the medium and long-run they will do. This also requires using the most 
plausible and consistent estimates in terms of length of run into the equilibrium model used. 
Second, 'quota market approaches' can be followed when the milk quota price is 
available in terms of rent or lease prices. In this case, marginal costs are estimated by the 
difference of milk price less the rental/lease price. Quota market approaches are in reality not 
without complications. For example in a number of cases the milk quota market does not 
exist. In case it exists, several factors have to be accounted for, before being able to obtain a 
reasonable quota rent (or marginal cost) estimate. Other factors influencing the quota price 
formation are fiscal treatment (tax credits or exemptions), the connectedness of milk 
production rights to land, as well as other institutional constraints (siphons, minimum transfer 
amounts, etc.). In case lease prices are used, one should for example be careful with respect to 
the time: just before the expiration of the quota year they may be subject to incidental shocks 
or circumstances and not provide a realistic picture of the structural position of the sector. In 
addition the expectations of farmers play a role (among others with respect to the survival of 
the quota system). For example, recently quota price declines were observed in several 
member states in the exchange of milk quotas due to negative expectation on the milk quotas 
survival. Moreover, if buy and sell prices have to be used (which present an estimate of the 
net present value of the market access right associated with the quota) a number of 
                                                 
5
 For several EU countries the number of farms in the decreasing region of marginal costs frequently out passes 
the number of farms in the increasing region of marginal costs. 
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assumptions (choice of discount rate and time horizon) are necessary to derive an estimate of 
the annual quota rent value. In principle this approach has the advantage that it implicitly 
takes into account the aggregation issue resulting from the equilibrium price as compared to 
'micro-econometric approaches'.  
Finally, a third 'synthetic approach' consists of guesstimating the potentially occurring 
quota rents at Member State level. This approach lacks empirical estimation but synthesises 
quota rent levels based on various sources of information such as previous studies and recent 
market developments. Synthetic approaches suffer of a lack of empirics and they suffer often 
from 'ad-hocery' and a degree of  arbitrariness. They are frequently the results of exchanges 
with information coming from the market and experts. However this approach is better 
capable to take recent market developments and institutional changes into account than micro-
econometric approaches, which rely on past time series information. Options for estimating 
milk quota rents are also discussed in Grinsted and Nielsen, (2004). This section  continues 
with an overview on the milk quota rents used by AGMEMOD, CAPSIM, EDIM and GTAP. 
From Table 1 it appear that the weighted average of milk quota rents used by AGMEMOD, 
CAPSIM and GTAP are very similar whereas EDIM is using on average larger estimates. 
 
Table 1 - Milk quota rents used into several equilibrium models (% milk prices) 
 
Countries AGMEMOD 2008 CAPSIM 2008 EDIM 2008 GTAP 2005 
BE 34.3 30.3 46.7 20.0 
DK 8.8 15.1 31.5 26.0 
DE 20.2 10.3 45.4 20.0 
GR 12.7 9.1 34.3 0.0 
ES 29.5 42.1 40.9 24.0 
FR 15.1 19.4 36.4 22.0 
IE 35.0 27.6 36.0 31.0 
IT 9.7 27.9 33.3 23.0 
NL 36.0 48.2 43.6 23.0 
AT 33.4 30.6 37.1 17.0 
PT 8.6 14.1 19.9 0.0 
FI 4.0 6.9 40.7 15.0 
SE 15.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 
UK 15.8 0.0 0.0 27.0 
CZ 3.0 0.0 0.0  
EE 0.0 0.0 0.0  
HU 3.0 0.0 0.0  
LT 0.0 0.0 0.0  
LV 8.9 0.0 0.0  
PL 8.0 0.0 0.0  
SL 0.0 0.0 0.0  
SK 0.0 0.0 0.0  
BG 0.0 0.0 0.0  
RO 0.0 0.0 0.0  
EU15  20.1 21.0 22.0 
EU25  16.3   
EU27  15.1   
EU27 weighted 17.66 16.61 28.73 18.73 
 
 
Note: Quota rents equal to zero indicate that milk quotas are not considered to be binding. 
Source: Own table. 
 
AGMEMOD (see for further details Chantreuil, et al., 2008) calculates EU15 member 
state milk quota rents as a difference from the actual fat content producer (raw) milk price 
from NewCronos (Eurostat) and the marginal milk production costs as estimated in Réquillart 
et al., (2008). For the EU12 new member states milk quota rents are approximated by taking 
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10 percent of the quota lease price (as provided by Réquillart et al., 2008) and dividing it by 
the producer milk price. From the quota rents and milk prices in 2000, milk production costs 
are retrieved and projected into the future in order to give an annual milk cost index. The 
production cost index is assumed to change following changes in feed costs and the other 
input costs. CAPSIM (see for further details Witzke and Tonini, 2008) uses as default 
assumption the quota rent used by Réquillart et al., (2008) that are calculated from milk prices 
and marginal costs for the starting point of the recent simulation (i.e. 2008). This was done in 
order to reflect the current situation while removing short run impacts such as the quota over-
run for a given year. The simulated quota rent for 2008 used in EDIM are thus a more suitable 
starting point for a comparative static model like CAPSIM than, for example, the historical 
marginal costs and quota rents in 2005. ESIM (see for further details Bouamra-Mechemache 
et al., 2008) uses the set of long run quota rents estimated by Moro et al., (2005). These 
estimates are for the EU15 and based on a detailed micro-analysis using FADN data, 
consistently applying the same methodology to each EU member states. In the 
aforementioned models adjustments are often made for those countries where milk quotas are 
no longer binding (e.g. Sweden and United Kingdom). Adjustments are made in order to 
reflect quota rents equal to zero or equivalently marginal costs being equal to the base year's 
milk price.  
In the GTAP computable general equilibrium model instead of using a consistent set 
of estimated quota rents, Lips and Rieder, (2005) prefer to rely on mixed sources. In so doing, 
they obtain estimates for the ratio between milk market price and milk shadow prices for 
Austria and Germany from national experts. They then rely on Kleinhanss et al., (2001), who 
provide an aggregate EU raw milk quota rent of 7.9 billion Euros in order to get an aggregate 
residual quota rent for all EU-15, with the exception of Austria, Germany, Greece, and 
Portugal6. The authors then use information on raw milk prices and quota quantities at the 
member state level in order to disaggregate the residual quota rent for each EU nation. They 
also do this relying on quota rent estimates from the INRA-Wageningen Consortium, (2002). 
For consistency, the obtained quota rents are downsized in order to meet the constraint of the 
guesstimated residual quota rent. 
When considering the aforementioned studies it appears that the INRA-Wageningen 
Consortium, (2002) and its follow up in EDIM (Bouamra-Mechemache et al., 2008) play a 
central role. Other studies use it as a reference. A common element across the different studies 
is that none of them fully rely on 'micro-econometric approaches'. Micro-econometric 
estimates are usually taken as initial source which is then confronted with expert information 
in order to reflect recent market development. In practice a mixture of empirical estimates, 
'quota market approaches' and 'synthetic approaches' is used.  
 
                                                 
6
 The last two countries listed have no quota rents since their quotas are not binding for the base year. Therefore, 
they are exempt from any quota rent calculations.  
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As regards the supply, all studies use aggregate supply functions at member state 
level, but none of them discusses the aggregation issue. the supply responses, AGMEMOD 
and EDIM use empirical estimates, whereas CAPSIM bases itself on other studies. EDIM has 
a dynamic supply side structure, with the supply elasticity being different for different lengths 
of run. All models have inelastic supply responses, which roughly range from 0.3 to 0.7. No 
study really takes into account inefficiencies in the current structure of the dairy sector due to 
the institutional characteristics of the quota system, although the EDIM study discusses the 
effect at a conceptual level. 
Other aspects, likely to affect milk supply, which could not be directly taken into 
account in the comparative analysis in the following section because of a lack of sufficient 
information are: supply shifters and farm restructuring information. Increase in efficiency 
over time caused by technical change, genetic progress, increased farmer skills and improved 
farming practices is also an important aspect in determining the position of the supply curve. 
These shifts are usually embedded in the so-called supply shifters. Apart from technical 
change also changes in other prices (than the milk price) can in principle lead to a shift in the 
supply curve, which can be in either downward or upward direction, depending on the 
specific price changes (increased feed prices, for example, will induce an upward shift of the 
supply curve). Farm size (re)structuring is related to the milk supply response at sector level 
by Tonini and Jongeneel, (2008) in a specific case study for Poland. 
 
An in-depth comparative analysis 
In this section the key economic variables (quota rents prices responses) are taken into 
account and put in a stylized comparative static framework. A common base year for 2005 
(derived from the EDIM study) is selected to analyze cow milk projected output changes 
under various assumptions. The demand side is taken into account in a simplified way 
because the focus is on the supply side. Two alternatives are considered. First, the price 
decline associated with quota abolition after 2015 is considered exogenous using value taken 
from the EDIM model (see their scenario QR09) as a best estimate7. Given this projected 
price decline a comparative static projection is made using the base year assumptions and the 
key economic variables. Second, a linear aggregate EU derived demand for raw milk is 
specified (i.e. endogenous milk price decline). A demand price elasticity of -0.4, and a 
demand shift of 1 percent per annum are assumed (Soregaroli et al., 2005). In addition, it is 
assumed that the considered milk reform takes place over a period of 7 years. This latter price 
projection results from the interaction of the supply module of each of the considered models 
with a similar aggregate EU demand curve for raw milk. 
Table 2 provides an overview of the (production share) weighted average quota rent and 
supply responses as well as the aggregate model outcomes. As can be seen the (weighted) 
milk supply elasticity is lowest for CAPSIM, highest for AGMEMOD, with EDIM taking an 
                                                 
7
 This corresponds to an 11 percent price decline. 
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intermediate position. As regards the marginal costs CAPSIM and AGMEMOD are quite 
similar, with EDIM’s estimate being about 15 percent lower. Equivalently, the (weighted 
average) quota rent estimate for EDIM (29% of the milk price) is significantly higher than 
that for CAPSIM (17%) and AGMEMOD (18%) (See Table 2). In principle, multiplying the 
effective price change (column 3) with the milk price elasticity (column 1) should give the 
projected milk supply increase (column 4). Here it is not exactly the case, due to the 
weighting procedure used. What the top of Table 2 makes clear is that the very similar and 
relatively low quota rent assumption in CAPSIM and AGMEMOD plays an important role in 
explaining the limited supply increase result of these models. Therefore it is mostly the 
difference in milk supply elasticities which explains the difference in outcome between 
CAPSIM and AGMEMOD. Taking into account the dynamics in the supply side, the medium 
to long-run milk supply elasticities of EDIM and AGMEMOD seems to lie in a similar range, 
with the CAPSIM model having relative inelastic milk supply responses. 
Table 2 (bottom part) also shows the projected results change when taking into account 
the interaction with a demand curve, rather than considering an exogenous price decline.  A 
relatively low marginal cost (e.g. EDIM), and/or a relatively elastic supply response (e.g. 
AGMEMOD) generate a relatively high supply increase. However, at the same time the 
expansion pressure from the supply side, when confronted with the demand curve, drives 
prices down. This relatively strong price decline dampens the final milk supply increase. In 
case of CAPSIM, with a relatively low quota rent and relatively inelastic supply response the 
induced price decline is much less. This causes the projected supply increase to be about 7 
percent (more than double of what was found in the upper past of Table 2). In case of the 
endogenous price simulation, the projected output increases for EDIM and AGMEMOD are 
rather similar, although the strongly differ with respect to their supply elasticity estimates (see 
also Table A1). So the interaction with demand matters: it contributes to a certain kind of 
convergence of the models with respect to the projected milk supply increase at the cost of a 
divergence with respect to the projected milk price declines. Moreover, it downgrades the role 
of differences in supply elasticities on the final output volume. With an inelastic demand for 
raw milk, the possibilities to expand production are limited: the price will quickly decline and 
curb the expansion of output. Disaggregated results are available in Annex I.  
 
 13
Table 2: The role of quota rent and supply elasticity estimates  
 
Model Milk price elasticity 
 
(1) 
Marginal cost (€/kg) 
 
(2) 
Effective %-price 
change 
 
(3) 
Projected supply 
increase (%) 
(4) 
Projected price decline 
(%) 
(5) 
 Exogenous Price Decline 
AGMEMOD 0.63 0.241 9.8 7.2 -11.0 
CAPSIM 0.27 0.243 10.9 3.3 -11.0 
EDIM 0.40 0.205 32.1 11.4 -11.0 
 Endogenous Price Decline 
AGMEMOD 
0.63 0.241 
10.9  
(5.0 – 8.0)  
8.8 
(3.7 – 4.8) 
-10.9 
CAPSIM 
0.27 0.243 
20.9 
(7.5) 
7.0 
(2.8) 
-0.1 
EDIM 
0.40 0.205 
27.8 
(12.0) 
11.4 
(4.6) 
-9.0 
 
 
Note: In brackets price and quantity changes are reported as from the original results of these models under a 
quota abolition scenario. Source: Own calculations. 
 
Several caveats have to be noted. First note that the obtained results might partly differ 
from the results presented in the original studies. This is because the responses to changes in 
non-milk prices (feed) are not taken into account in this analysis. Moreover, the role of supply 
shift variables (technical change and autonomous milk yield increases) is currently neglected8. 
However, when comparing our results with the ones presented in the individual studies, this 
gives an impression of the role played by the ignored factors. For example, our projected 
supply increase estimate of 11 percent, exceeds that of the EDIM study with about 5 percent. 
Implicitly this implies that the compensating impact of the other factors was equivalent with a 
5 reduction in the milk expansion. So, although not taken into account, the role of non-milk 
price responses as well as the shift variables deserves some attention in comparing and 
explaining (differences in) model outcomes.  
Table 3 shows that the models slightly differ in the importance they attribute to 
individual member states. All three studies converge on the importance of the Netherlands, 
which on average explains 33 percent of the EU’s aggregate supply response. EDIM and 
AGMEMOD identify Germany as an important contributor (average share in EU’s total milk 
expansion is 30%), whereas CAPSIM ranks Germany as a member state which will decline in 
milk production when the price decline is exogenous. CAPSIM has Spain as a second 
important member state expanding production under the exogenous price decline assumption 
whereas it shifts to the intermediate category when price decline is endogenous. As regards 
the member states with a declining milk production, the predicted increase of milk output by 
the UK and Sweden in AGMEMOD is strange, and could be traced back to the quota rent 
assumptions made. 
 
                                                 
8
 Unfortunately when writing the paper, it was not possible to fully recover this information, which was the main 
reason to exclude it from the comparison. As will be made clear with respect to the demand side an autonomous 
shift is taken into account, at least in one sub case. 
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Table 3: The role of individual member states in explaining the EU’s milk supply 
Model Member states with expansion share 
greater or equal to 15% 
Member states with expansion share between 0% 
and 15% 
Member states with declining production 
 Exogenous Price Decline 
AGMEMOD DE, IE, NL BL, GR, ES, FR, AT, SE, UK DK, IT, PT, FI, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, 
SL, SK, BG, RO 
CAPSIM ES, FR, IT, NL BL, DK, IE, AT, PT DE, GR, FI, SE, UK, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, 
PL, SL, SK, BG, RO 
EDIM DE, FR, NL BL, DK, GR, ES, IE, IT, AT, PT, FI, EE SE, UK, CZ, HU, LT, LV, PL, SL, SK, BG, 
RO 
 Endogenous Price Decline 
AGMEMOD DE, NL BL, DK, GR, ES, FR, IE, IT, AT, SE, UK PT, FI, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, SL, SK, 
BG, RO 
CAPSIM NL BL, DK, DE, GR, ES, FR, IE, IT, AT, PT, FI, EE, HU, 
LT, LV, SL, SK, BG, RO 
SE, UK, CZ, PL 
EDIM DE, FR, NL BL, DK, GR, ES, IE, IT, AT, PT, FI, EE SE, UK, CZ, HU, LT, LV, PL, SL, SK, BG, 
RO 
 
 
Note: In bold font are countries which are in the same expansion category across the three models. 
Source: Own table. 
 
As regards the role of the shifters no precise analysis could be made. However, when 
comparing the projected supply increases with those reported in the studies, it turns out that 
they are rather similar. This implies that in general the net impact of the shifters on the supply 
side has been rather ‘neutral’. Or, alternatively, the impact from positive shifters (technical 
change, genetic progress) and negative shifters (increased feed prices) more or less balances. 
 
Conclusion  
The paper analyzed how the different economic supply components, as they are part of 
the three key dairy models, affect milk production projections. The aim was to support policy 
makers to get better insights in the implications of some of the most important economic 
assumptions  and empirical choices made in partial equilibrium models focusing on dairy. 
First, the economic significance of milk quotas from a microeconomic perspective showed 
that it is difficult to estimate these rents. Several approaches are possible, but the obtained 
estimates will remain object of debate and subject to be confronted with recent market 
developments and expert information. Second, the review on milk quota rents used in the 
three models along with several considerations highlighted that there is some convergence in 
applied modelling. Several studies use the quota rent estimates from the Wageningen-INRA 
consortium and later on its follow-up in the EDIM project as a reference. These estimates are 
based on an extensive empirical analysis. Other studies add their own adjustments to these 
estimates. Third, the impacts of milk quota rents and supply elasticity on the final outcomes 
of the three models considered through a comparative static framework showed that the key 
factors (milk quota rents and supply elasticities) should be considered not in an isolated but 
rather an integrated way. This also implies that only focusing on the quota rent issue is short-
sighted. It is good to realize that the quota rents are only one factor explaining the final result. 
Unfortunately the supply side dynamics (shifters) could not be well-addressed. Its importance 
might easily outweigh other factors and need therefore careful treatment (farm structural 
adjustments). 
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A main conclusion is that the evaluation of the contribution of a study should not be 
based on one single characteristic (such as quota rents or supply responses). One isolated 
characteristic is not able to explain finally obtained model outcomes. Quota rents, supply 
responses, shifters and the demand side have to be integrated with each other. 
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Appendix I 
Table A1: Overview on the effective price change and projected quantity response 
 
Countries BL DK DE GR ES FR IE IT NL AT PT FI SE UK CZ EE HU LT LV PL SL SK BG RO 
Effective Price Change 
AGMEMOD 35 -2 12 2 26 5 37 -1 39 34 -3 -7 5 6 -8 -11 -8 -11 -2 -3 -11 -11 -11 -11 
CAPSIM 28 5 -1 -2 54 10 23 23 72 28 4 -4 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 
EDIM 67 30 63 35 50 40 39 33 58 42 11 50 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 
Projected Quantity Response 
AGMEMOD 906 -59 1974 8 1124 665 1502 -132 3293 693 -27 -91 89 492 -35 -30 -76 -70 -8 -160 -26 -55 -49 -69 
CAPSIM 328 66 -46 -5 1066 701 423 760 2111 178 21 -35 -84 -440 -74 -21 -43 -39 -16 -236 -16 -17 -26 -41 
EDIM 631 558 6383 84 865 3173 829 1241 2758 334 88 517 -161 -612 -164 0 -121 -81 -40 -651 -30 -63 -17 -22 
Effective Price Change 
AGMEMOD 39 1 15 5 28 8 39 2 43 36 -1 -4 9 7 -8 -12 -8 -12 -3 -5 -12 -12 -12 -12 
CAPSIM 43 18 11 10 72 24 38 39 93 44 16 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EDIM 68 32 64 37 49 41 38 36 60 41 11 53 -9 -12 -13 -14 -13 -14 -14 -15 -14 -14 -14 -14 
Projected Quantity Response 
AGMEMOD 990 19 2515 22 1204 1038 1582 190 3659 751 -6 -49 169 578 -32 -33 -70 -75 -11 -227 -28 -59 -52 -74 
CAPSIM 512 242 673 21 1438 1609 699 1248 2728 276 95 58 -1 -6 -1 0 -1 -1 0 -4 0 0 0 -1 
EDIM 636 591 6517 88 843 3229 804 1326 2846 333 88 545 -131 -685 -187 0 -137 -105 -52 -879 -38 -82 -22 -28 
 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
